Over the past three years Iran has experienced an unprecedented surge in executions. What began in 2022 intensified year after year, placing Iran at the top of global execution statistics. Reports from credible human rights organizations and UN bodies indicate that these executions function less as judicial penalties and more as a deliberate instrument of repression and social control.
Rising execution figures
- 2022: At least 578 executions were carried out, according to Iran Human Rights Monitor (Iran HRM).
- 2023: The figure rose to 850 executions. Amnesty International described this increase as alarming and highlighted Iran’s disproportionate share of global executions that year.
- 2024: HRM and Ensemble Contre la Peine de Mort (ECPM) recorded 993 executions, the highest number in 17 years.
- 2025 (through end of August): The UN Human Rights Office reported at least 972 executions, indicating the trend remains sustained and may surpass 2024’s total.
Political and security-related executions
A significant portion of recent executions has targeted political prisoners and protest participants. During the uprising in 2022, at least seven demonstrators — including Mohsen Shekari and Majidreza Rahnavard — were executed after expedited trials lacking due process. The pattern continued in following years: in September 2025 Mehran Bahramian, detained during the unrest, was executed on charges of moharebeh (“enmity against God”).
Notable figures such as Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani, who were associated with the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign, were executed in 2024 and became symbols of repression. At least 14 political prisoners currently remain under death sentences. These practices are clear violations of Iran’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Drug-related executions
A prominent feature of recent years is the return to large numbers of executions for drug-related offenses. In 2024, HRM reported at least 503 executions for drug charges — over half of that year’s total executions. This surge follows a 2017 reform that was expected to reduce capital punishment for drug crimes. Most of those executed were from marginalized communities, frequently denied access to independent counsel or fair trials. Many executions were carried out in groups and without prior family notification, suggesting that drug-related prosecutions are being used to sustain high execution rates and to project a climate of fear.
Ethnic and religious minorities
Executions disproportionately affect ethnic and religious minorities:
- Baluch:
- 2022: at least 174 Baluch prisoners executed (≈30% of that year’s total).
- 2023: 184 Baluch executed.
- 2024: at least 110 Baluch executed, many in drug-related cases and often without proper notification to families.
- Kurds: At least 53 Kurdish prisoners were executed in the first half of 2024.
- Sunni prisoners: Reports indicate continued executions of Sunni detainees, notably in Rajai Shahr and Zahedan prisons.
- Afghan nationals: In 2024, at least 80 Afghan nationals were executed in Iran — roughly three times the previous year’s figure — often without effective consular protection.
These figures demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory application of the death penalty against marginalized ethnic and religious groups.
Women and juvenile offenders
The execution of women and persons who were minors at the time of the alleged offense remains deeply troubling.
- The Women’s Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) documented at least 34 women executed in 2024, the highest annual number in 17 years. Several of those women had acted in contexts of domestic violence yet were sentenced to death.
- Iran continues to execute people who were under 18 at the time of the alleged conduct. Three documented cases cited in the Persian report are included here:
- Sajjad Sanjari — arrested as a teenager in Kermanshah and executed in 2021 after years on death row.
- Marjan Hajizadeh — from Fars province; executed in 2024 while she was under 18 at the time of the incident.
- Noormohammad Baluch — a 17-year-old executed in Zahedan in 2024; human rights monitors report several Baluch minors were executed that year.
These cases constitute blatant violations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the ICCPR.
Qisas (retribution)
A substantial share of executions are carried out under qisas (retribution-in-kind). In 2024, around 43% of executions fell into this category. Although Iranian law theoretically allows victims’ relatives to pardon offenders or accept diyya (blood money), that option is frequently unavailable in politically sensitive cases. The executions of Reza Rasaei and Mehran Bahramian — both tied to protest-related cases — illustrate how qisas can be applied selectively and in a politically instrumentalized manner.
Contradictory positions of government-affiliated figures on executions
The scale and political use of executions have prompted candid remarks even from some figures close to the establishment.
- Abbas Abdi, a prominent political commentator, said in September 2025: “If you support public punishments — stoning, executions, or any corporal penalties — then broadcast them directly on television!” He added there is no credible evidence that executions are deterrent. (Sources: Eghtesad News, Donya-e-Eqtesad.)
Such statements reflect an acknowledgment within certain regime circles that executions serve more as a public display of state power than as a genuine deterrent — reinforcing the analysis that the policy aims to intimidate and manage political instability.
Reactions and consequences
Despite severe repression, opposition voices persist. Families of the executed, political prisoners, and the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign have repeatedly protested these policies. Some Iranian political and religious figures — including Mir-Hossein Mousavi and clerics in Qom — have warned against misuse of charges such as moharebeh.
Internationally, pressure has been mounting: the UN Human Rights Office called for an immediate halt to executions in August 2025; UN High Commissioner Volker Türk condemned systematic abuses. Amnesty International has called for targeted sanctions against judges and officials responsible for capital cases. In 2024, the European Parliament adopted a resolution sanctioning 31 judges of Iran’s Revolutionary Courts for their role in issuing death sentences.
Conclusion
Executions in Iran have evolved into a systematic machinery of repression. The sharp rise in numbers, the targeting of protesters and political detainees, the disproportionate impact on minority groups, women and juveniles, and the selective application of qisas all indicate that the death penalty is being used as a tool for regime survival — not for justice.
Yet resistance persists. A prominent manifestation of that resistance is the “No to Execution Tuesdays” campaign, which emerged from within Iran’s prisons and has gained external visibility.
In Part II, this series will examine the origins and expansion of that campaign, its role in sustaining prisoner-led dissent, and its resonance in international advocacy.
