Execution, Imprisonment, and the Engineering of Intimidation within the Leadership-Controlled Structure (1989–2026)

1- The Death Penalty: From Judicial Instrument to Tool of Governance

During the leadership of Ali Khamenei, Iran has consistently ranked among the countries with the highest execution rates per capita worldwide. Executions have not been limited to murder cases; they have also been carried out for drug-related offenses, security-related charges, political activities, and in some cases against individuals who were under 18 at the time of the alleged offense.

Annual reports by international human rights organizations indicate that since 2021, the pace of executions has accelerated. In 2023 and 2024, hundreds of executions were recorded, and in 2025, independent sources reported the highest annual execution figures in decades. A significant portion of these executions has not been officially announced and has been documented through non-official sources or family accounts.

Within Iran’s judicial structure, the Head of the Judiciary is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, and provincial judicial heads operate within the same chain of appointment. This centralized system consolidates structural responsibility for overarching penal policies at the highest level.

2- Official Justifications and the Concept of “Moharebeh”

In official discourse, Ali Khamenei has repeatedly emphasized the need for “decisive” action against what is described as “security disruption.” During nationwide protests, some detainees have faced charges such as “moharebeh” (waging war against God) and “corruption on earth”; concepts within the Islamic Penal Code that can result in death sentences.

In speeches following protests, he has described demonstrators as “corrupt,” “thugs,” or “agents of the enemy,” and has urged the judiciary to act without “hesitation” or “delay.” This official rhetoric has coincided with expedited proceedings in protest-related cases, leading to death sentences and executions within a short period after arrest.

Cases such as the execution of Navid Afkari in 2020, as well as several executions linked to the 2022 protests, triggered serious international concern regarding fair trial standards, access to independent legal counsel, and allegations of torture used to extract confessions.

3- Executions Following Nationwide Protests

After the 2019 and 2022 uprisings, waves of mass arrests followed. Among those detained, a number of defendants were prosecuted on security-related charges and, in some cases, sentenced to death. UN Special Rapporteurs expressed concern about death sentences issued in the context of protests and the use of coerced confessions.

The pattern observed during these periods includes:

• Mass arrests in the early days of protests;
• Transfer of cases to specific branches of Revolutionary Courts;
• Restricted access to chosen legal counsel;
• Heavy sentences issued within a short timeframe;
• Rapid implementation of death sentences in certain cases.

This trend highlights the application of capital punishment within periods of political crisis.

4- Prisons: Torture, Prolonged Solitary Confinement, and Medical Deprivation

Multiple reports by international human rights bodies have described conditions in Iranian prisons — including Evin, Greater Tehran (Fashafouyeh), Qarchak (Varamin), Qezel Hesar, Vakilabad (Mashhad), Adelabad (Shiraz), Sheiban (Ahvaz), Dastgerd (Isfahan), and prisons across various provinces — as amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment.

Documented cases include:

• Long-term solitary confinement;
• Beatings and pressure to obtain confessions;
• Threats against family members;
• Denial of access to specialized medical care;
• Punitive transfers to prisons far from detainees’ place of residence.

In certain instances, deaths in custody or shortly after release have been reported. In a structure where the Prison Organization operates under the Judiciary appointed by the Leader, and security bodies play a direct role in arrest and interrogation, the issue of effective oversight and independent accountability becomes critical.

The deliberate denial of medical treatment to prisoners, particularly political detainees, has been repeatedly documented and raises serious concerns under international human rights standards.

5- Corporal Punishments and the Continuation of Harsh Penalties

The Islamic Penal Code continues to prescribe punishments such as flogging and amputation. In recent years, cases of finger amputations carried out in certain prisons and flogging sentences against civil and labor activists have been recorded.

International bodies have considered such punishments incompatible with the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under international law. The continued implementation of these penalties during the leadership of Ali Khamenei, without structural reform or suspension, reflects the persistence of a rigid punitive framework.

6- Electoral Engineering: From Limited Competition to Consolidation

Over the past three decades, the disqualification of parliamentary and presidential candidates has become a recurring practice. Criteria such as “practical commitment to Velayat-e Faqih” have been used to exclude political competitors. In recent election cycles, the scope of disqualifications has extended even to insiders, narrowing the field to a limited circle of aligned figures.

Declining public participation in the later years of this period has been interpreted as an indicator of a widening gap between the formal political structure and segments of society. Under these conditions, elections have increasingly functioned less as mechanisms of power transfer and more as mechanisms of power consolidation.

7- Suppression of Lawyers and the Erosion of the Right to Defense

A prominent indicator of weakened judicial safeguards during this period has been pressure on defense attorneys representing political prisoners.

Following the 2022 uprising, dozens of lawyers were summoned or detained. In one notable case, 17 attorneys in Mashhad faced prosecution on charges of “propaganda against the regime,” despite a prior decision to close the case.

The arrest or intimidation of lawyers defending detainees sends a clear message: independent legal defense itself may become framed as a security offense. This development undermines one of the fundamental pillars of fair trial guarantees.

8- Minorities and Heightened Security Pressure

In regions with ethnic and religious minorities, security responses to local activism have, in some cases, been reported as more severe. Some heavy sentences and executions have occurred in these areas. Reports have also documented religious restrictions and discrimination in employment and education.

Analytical Conclusion of Part Two

Between 1989 and 2026, capital punishment, the prison system, and a rigid penal framework have become enduring components of political control.

Key characteristics of this period include:

• High execution rates in global comparison;
• Use of security-related charges to impose severe sentences;
• Persistent concerns regarding fair trial standards;
• Repeated reports of torture and medical deprivation;
• Continued implementation of corporal punishments incompatible with international standards.

The centralized appointment power at the head of the Judiciary and security institutions intensifies the question of structural and command responsibility regarding these penal policies.

Beyond repression in the streets and the penal system, the broader architecture of security-centered governance also extends into economic priorities and regional strategy; the next section examines how this security paradigm has shaped fiscal policy, foreign engagement, and the structural dynamics of command responsibility.