This report is the third part of our analytical series on the structure of corruption within the ruling regime in Iran.
The first report outlined the overall architecture of systemic corruption, and the second revealed the mechanisms of large-scale economic corruption and state-sponsored rent networks.
The present report turns to an area whose human, social, and rights-related consequences are deeper and more devastating than any other: security-linked corruption and the role of state institutions in the trafficking of women, girls, and children.
This report demonstrates that human trafficking in Iran is not a scattered or marginal criminal activity; it is embedded within the regime’s underground economy and security apparatus. International assessments, official statements from regime-controlled media, and documents published by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) indicate that, rather than combating trafficking, security and law-enforcement forces have, in many cases, facilitated, ignored, or even partnered with organized trafficking networks.
This entrenched structure has kept Iran in the world’s lowest anti-trafficking category (Tier 3) and intensified the systematic exploitation of vulnerable populations.
1. International Assessment: Iran in Tier 3
For consecutive years, the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report has placed Iran in Tier 3, the lowest global ranking. Tier 3 means:
- The state does not meet minimum international standards to combat trafficking.
- It makes no meaningful or structural effort toward improvement;
- And in numerous cases, state officials are complicit in trafficking or deliberately turn a blind eye.
According to these reports, Iran not only fails to identify and protect trafficking victims, but often prosecutes and punishes them as offenders, including women coerced into cross-border movement or sexual exploitation.
The absence of a national action plan, lack of victim-support frameworks, and the failure to prosecute security actors involved in trafficking have solidified Iran’s Tier 3 designation.
Tier 3 ultimately shows that trafficking in Iran is not a disorder to be fixed; it is a structural outcome maintained because powerful factions benefit from it.
2. Official Admissions in State Media: Existence of Trafficking Networks and Southern Routes
Despite attempts by regime authorities to downplay or deny the problem, state media and officials have repeatedly acknowledged the existence of human trafficking networks.
2.1. Admission by the Police Immigration Chief
In an interview with ISNA, the head of Iran’s Immigration and Passport Police openly stated:
“We do not deny the trafficking of Iranian girls to Arab countries… the main destination is the UAE.”
This statement is part of a broader pattern: reports from police units in Hormozgan and Sistan-Baluchestan frequently identify these regions as key corridors for human trafficking.
2.2. High-profile cases reported by state media
A 2023 IRNA report on the case of Sara Jarf Deriszadeh exposed a multi-layer trafficking network that used official-looking documents, including fake educational recommendations, to transfer women and girls to several regional countries.
The network involved dozens of individuals and illustrated that trafficking in Iran requires administrative complicity and facilitated passage through controlled routes.
2.3. Cluster of trafficking networks in southern provinces
Reports from southern police units show that arrests of human traffickers often coincide with large seizures of fuel and narcotics; evidence that human trafficking networks are structurally intertwined with smuggling networks, all operating under the protection provided by corruption in local security units.
Taken together, these official admissions reveal a clear pattern:
The regime acknowledges trafficking exists, but minimizes its scale while failing to dismantle its roots.
3. Security Corruption: Trafficking as a State-Linked System
Documents and reports by the NCRI Women’s Committee; indicate that trafficking of women and children in Iran is deeply linked to security and paramilitary structures, rather than operating independently of them.
3.1. Local collusion and principal trafficking routes
According to these reports, three major trafficking routes dominate:
- Hormozgan → United Arab Emirates (the primary channel)
- Sistan-Baluchestan → Pakistan → Persian Gulf states
- Khuzestan → Iraq and Kuwait
Domestic legal experts quoted in Iranian media confirm that administrative corruption and cooperation between traffickers and police forces significantly facilitate safe passage for these networks.
3.2. Role of security actors
Sources report that in many areas:
- Security and paramilitary forces provide route information.
- They turn a blind eye to crossings or take “fees” to allow movement.
- And in southern coastal areas, selected networks enjoy practical immunity.
This arrangement turns trafficking from a criminal market into a security-economic subsystem, integrated into the power structure.
4. Exploitation, Deception, and Cross-Border Trafficking of Women and Girls
Trafficking of women in Iran typically operates through two principal methods:
4.1. Social deception model
Victims are recruited through promises of:
- employment,
- education,
- marriage,
- or short-term travel,
Only to be transferred to the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and sometimes Malaysia.
4.2. Religious-legal cover (temporary marriage)
Several cases reveal that the concept of sigheh (temporary marriage) is used as a legal facade for transferring women and girls to trafficking networks abroad.
4.3. Human consequences
Victims often:
- have no safe means of return,
- face violence and exploitation,
- And upon returning to Iran, face criminal prosecution rather than support.
This last point is one of the core reasons behind Iran’s Tier 3 ranking:
victims are punished instead of protected.
5. “Honey-Trap” Networks: Sexual Exploitation as a Security Tool
Another key manifestation of security corruption is the network known as “parastoo” operations, in which sexual entrapment is used:
- for blackmail,
- for political suppression,
- to eliminate rivals,
- Or for intelligence extraction.
Leaked documents identify the involvement of individuals tied to security and military structures, including the relatives of high-ranking officials.
These operations show that sexual exploitation is not only profitable but also utilized as a mechanism of political control within the regime.
6. Human Rights Analysis: Trafficking as an Instrument of Structural Repression
6.1. Criminalization of victims
Women who were trafficked abroad and later returned to Iran often face charges such as:
- “Acts against chastity,”
- “Illegal exit,”
- Or “immoral relations.”
This is a direct violation of international principles requiring non-punitive treatment of trafficking victims.
6.2. Impunity of security actors
There is no public record of meaningful prosecution of security officials involved in trafficking, despite numerous independent reports documenting involvement.
This impunity violates the principle of equality before the law.
6.3. Structural vulnerabilities
Economic hardship, gender discrimination, and lack of social protection make women and girls especially vulnerable.
Thus, trafficking is not an isolated crime it is the combined result of economic corruption, legal discrimination, and security repression.
7. Conclusion
Security-linked corruption in Iran; particularly in the trafficking of women, girls, and children; is a multi-layered and deeply institutionalized system.
Evidence shows that trafficking is not conducted by isolated criminal groups but by established networks that:
- operate with protection along major border and coastal routes;
- Benefit from administrative and security collusion.
- Use sexual exploitation for profit and political control.
- And punish victims instead of perpetrators.
This structure makes human trafficking part of the regime’s model of governance and underground economy, where security corruption, social repression, and human exploitation reinforce one another.
