Criminalization, Human Harm, and the Legal Case Against Iran’s Digital Repression
Part I demonstrated how the ruling regime in Iran developed a system of enforced digital isolation based on centralized control, filtering, throttling, and selective connectivity.
Part II examines the consequences of this system. It analyzes how internet restrictions have been reinforced through criminalization, security rhetoric, suppression of journalism, interference with healthcare and livelihoods, and measures that obstruct accountability for human rights violations.
The evidence shows that internet shutdowns in Iran are not only communication restrictions. They are mechanisms that shape visibility, isolate victims, weaken documentation, and reduce the possibility of timely scrutiny during periods of repression.
Criminalizing the Exit Routes: Satellite Internet and the Legal Architecture of Isolation
The regime’s strategy has not been limited to shutting down or degrading the internet. It has also moved to criminalize independent methods of access to the outside world.
On 2 February 2026, according to a report published by Khabar Online citing legal commentary, Amin Fallahnejad, a lawyer, referred to Article 5 of the Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and stated that unauthorized satellite-based internet equipment, including Starlink-type devices, had been criminalized.
The first category reportedly includes personal use, possession, purchase, sale, transport, or import of such equipment for individual use. According to the quoted legal interpretation, such conduct may be punishable by imprisonment ranging from six months to two years, along with confiscation of the equipment.
The second category reportedly includes supply, production, distribution, installation, activation, or import for the purpose of distribution. For this category, the reported penalty is two to five years of imprisonment.
The third and most severe framing links such acts to intent to act against the state or to espionage. In such cases, the legal commentary indicated that the conduct could fall under far heavier punishments, including execution or long-term imprisonment.
This legal framing turns independent connectivity into a potential national-security offense and raises the cost of bypassing state-controlled networks during future protests or crackdowns.
Official Rhetoric: Security Against Connectivity
The regime’s media rhetoric reinforces the same logic. State-aligned commentary has repeatedly framed open internet access as a threat to security rather than a public right.
In a report cited by Khabar Online on 24 January 2026, Kayhan attacked officials and public voices who supported reducing internet restrictions for the sake of business activity. The newspaper asked those demanding the reopening of an unrestricted online environment: “How much do you count each drop of a martyr’s blood?”
Kayhan also described profit from Instagram storefronts as “blood money,” alleging that such platforms facilitate violence against security forces.
The newspaper further attacked Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah, executive deputy to President Masoud Pezeshkian, after he apologized for the economic harm caused by shutdowns. Kayhan argued that officials should instead apologize for delays in building a “secure national infrastructure.”
These statements are significant because they reveal the ideological foundation of digital repression. Connectivity is framed not as a right, but as a security vulnerability.
Human Cost: Families, Victims, and Delayed Documentation
The restrictions imposed during the recent protest period affected not only political expression, but also the ability of families to report killings, locate detainees, and preserve evidence.
In reported cases from the January 2026 protests, families of victims faced delayed communication with the outside world because of nationwide internet and mobile-network disruptions.
The case of 15-year-old Ghazal Janghorban, reportedly shot in Isfahan on 9 January 2026, illustrates the human impact of this isolation. According to reports provided for documentation, news of her killing reached outside the country only after days of delay. Her family was reportedly placed under pressure to remain silent, and security forces allegedly removed mourning banners from the family home.
Other reported cases describe families attempting to avoid state control over the bodies of their loved ones. In the case of Sam Sohbatzadeh, relatives reportedly transferred his body at night and in secrecy to Ardabil Province, fearing confiscation by security forces.
Such accounts require careful verification before being presented as final findings. However, they show how shutdowns delay public knowledge, isolate families, and weaken evidence chains during moments of crisis.
Journalism Under Digital Siege
The shutdowns also obstructed independent journalism. Journalists outside Iran reported losing contact with local sources in smaller cities and remote areas during prolonged disruptions.
Reports provided for this documentation refer to journalists such as Assal Abbasian and Negar Mortazavi describing the disappearance of communication with sources inside Iran during the prolonged 2026 blackout.
In addition to network disruption, reports described arbitrary suspension of SIM cards belonging to journalists and media activists inside the country. Operators allegedly informed some affected users that reactivation required referral to judicial authorities and commitments not to engage in online activity.
This pattern combines technical disruption with administrative pressure and creates conditions favorable to self-censorship.
Healthcare, Emergency Services, and Digital Dependency
The shutdowns also affected access to essential services. According to OHCHR reporting, the January 2026 shutdown disrupted emergency and lifesaving services while hospitals were reportedly under severe pressure from casualties.
Iran’s increasing dependence on digital systems intensified the consequences. Electronic prescriptions, medical databases, verification systems, and hospital communication networks all became vulnerable to disruption.
Reports provided for this documentation stated that during the 2026 shutdowns, doctors and pharmacists faced problems receiving one-time passwords required for prescription verification. Patients with heart disease and cancer reportedly struggled to obtain essential medication.
There were also reports of disruption to hospital imaging systems, including PACS, limiting physicians’ access to radiology images needed for urgent diagnosis.
A reported medical testimony from Isfahan and Tehran stated that emergency numbers such as 115 and 110 were unreachable in some cases on the night of 8 January 2026.
These claims require careful evidentiary handling where primary documentation remains limited. However, the broader finding is clear: prolonged communication disruptions can interfere with emergency access, hospital coordination, and lifesaving services.
Economic Suffocation: Online Work, Small Businesses, and Digital Collapse
The economic consequences of the prolonged restrictions were severe. Digital disruption affected not only technology companies, but also ordinary workers, freelancers, women working from home, online sellers, drivers, advertisers, content producers, and local service providers.
Reports cited in the evidence base indicate that small and medium-sized enterprises dependent on online platforms suffered revenue losses of up to 80 to 90 percent.
Additional estimates placed direct economic losses at 30 to 40 million dollars per day, rising to as much as 80 million dollars per day when indirect effects were included.
Workers in online retail, search-engine optimization, advertising, and freelance services reportedly lost projects and income. Some were forced into temporary survival work, including ride-hailing and informal labor.
Beauty salons, small businesses, and home-based sellers that depended on Instagram or messaging platforms lost their main channels of visibility and customer access.
This economic damage carries a human rights dimension. When internet access becomes essential for work and income, prolonged restrictions interfere with the right to livelihood and an adequate standard of living.
Centralized Control and the Gateway System
The recent shutdowns highlight the importance of Iran’s centralized internet architecture.
The Telecommunication Infrastructure Company and national gateway-level controls operate within a structure capable of restricting international access while maintaining selected domestic connectivity.
Simultaneous traffic collapse across major networks, whitelist-based behavior, filtering without full route withdrawal, and the continued functioning of selected domestic services all indicate coordinated centralized control.
This structure enables the regime to preserve banking, official communications, and approved domestic platforms while suppressing independent reporting and cross-border communication.
International Responses: OHCHR, Volker Türk, and Amnesty International
International human rights bodies and organizations have repeatedly linked Iran’s internet shutdowns to concealment of abuses and obstruction of accountability.
In January 2026, OHCHR warned that the nationwide shutdown disrupted emergency and lifesaving services and obstructed independent human rights monitoring.
On 23 January 2026, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that the communications shutdown initiated on 8 January made facts harder to verify, prevented detainees from communicating with families or lawyers, and left people unable to know what was happening around them.
Amnesty International stated that authorities had blocked internet access in order to hide the extent of grave violations and obstruct documentation of unlawful killings.
These statements are critical because they connect shutdowns directly to accountability, evidence preservation, and protection from abuse.
Digital Restrictions and International Human Rights Law
The prolonged restrictions imposed during 2025 and 2026 raise serious concerns under international human rights law.
Iran is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 19 protects freedom of expression and the right to seek, receive, and impart information regardless of frontiers. Article 21 protects peaceful assembly.
Blanket or prolonged shutdowns interfere directly with these rights. They obstruct access to information, prevent communication across borders, and hinder independent documentation during moments of violence.
When shutdowns occur during protests, arrests, executions, or security operations, they can function as tools of concealment.
The criminalization of alternative connectivity tools deepens these concerns. If civilians face imprisonment or severe national-security charges for attempting to preserve communication during blackouts, the state is not merely restricting access; it is legally entrenching isolation.
Evidentiary Caution and Limits of the Available Record
This report distinguishes between well-supported technical findings and claims requiring further verification.
The strongest evidence concerns traffic collapse, active-probing failure, filtering, throttling, whitelist-based controls, protocol interference, and centralized gateway management.
The available evidence does not support a definitive finding of classic BGP hijacking during the recent shutdowns.
Some claims regarding healthcare disruption, emergency-phone access, and specific incidents require further primary documentation and should therefore be treated as reported cases rather than fully verified findings.
This evidentiary caution strengthens the credibility of the report and aligns it with international human rights documentation standards.
Conclusion
The internet restrictions imposed in Iran during 2025 and 2026 represent more than temporary communication disruptions. They reflect the consolidation of a system of controlled connectivity in which access to information is shaped by security priorities, political loyalty, and selective privilege.
The prolonged blackouts, near-total traffic collapses, whitelist-based controls, selective access channels, criminalization of satellite connectivity, and official rhetoric portraying open internet access as a security threat all point to a deliberate architecture of isolation.
For millions of people, the consequences have included restricted communication, delayed reporting of killings and arrests, isolation of families, obstruction of journalism, disruption of healthcare, collapse of online livelihoods, and deeper social and economic insecurity.
The regime’s digital strategy is not only about controlling the internet. It is about controlling visibility.
In this sense, Iran’s recent internet restrictions are best understood as an infrastructure of silence: a system designed to disconnect society, privilege loyal access, criminalize independent communication, and reduce the chances that future repression will be documented in time to prevent denial, impunity, and erasure.
