From Revolutionary Courts to the Implementation of Execution
The previous four reports in this series about repression examined, respectively, the legal and political structure of the judiciary, the mechanism for the selection and removal of judges, the role of Revolutionary Courts and security institutions, and then the denial of the right to defense and judicial criminalization. Report No. 5 follows the next stage of that same path; namely, the point at which a case already built through security detention, denial of counsel, coerced confessions, and vague criminal charges reaches a death sentence in the Revolutionary Court, passes rapidly through the outward form of appeal before the Supreme Court, and is ultimately carried out through an expedited, covert, or intimidation-based execution process. What is examined in this report is the final stage in the conversion of security repression into judicial elimination.
Revolutionary Courts; When the Security Narrative Becomes a Death Sentence
In political and security cases, the Revolutionary Court is not merely a court of adjudication. It is the point at which the narrative produced by security institutions is transformed into a judicial ruling. The concentration of jurisdiction in this court over charges such as moharebeh, efsad-e fel-arz, baghi, and other security-related offenses has ensured that nearly all major political and protest-related cases are directed to a structure marked by closed hearings, restrictions on defense, reliance on security officers’ reports, and disregard for allegations of torture.
In the wave of death penalty cases following the protests of Dey 1404, Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, presided over by Abolghasem Salavati, was one of the main centers of this process. The case of seven young protesters linked to Basij Base 185 Shahid Mahmoud Kaveh on Namjoo Street in Tehran was heard in this branch, and all defendants were sentenced to death on 20 Bahman 1404, corresponding to 9 February 2026. These seven were Amirhossein Hatami, Mohammadamin Biglari, Shahin Vahedparast, Ali Fahim, Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani, Shahab Zahdi, and Yaser Rajaeifar. In this case, restrictions on counsel, compressed proceedings, and limited access to the case file severely weakened, and in practice destroyed, the possibility of an effective defense from the outset.
The same branch also played a central role in the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou. His chosen lawyers were not accepted by the court, he was denied access to counsel during the first month of detention, and his lawyers were summoned for final defense only one day after being allowed to accept representation. They were told that there was an order to handle the case urgently. In such circumstances, the Revolutionary Court does not function as a forum for independent evaluation of evidence, but as the final link in completing a process already formed in detention and at the prosecutorial stage.
Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court has also played a prominent role in cases leading to death sentences. The case of Ehsan Hosseinpour Hesarlou and two juvenile defendants was heard in this branch. In addition, in the case of Vahid Bani Amerian, Abolhassan Montazer, Babak Alipour, Pouya Ghobadi, Akbar Daneshvarkar, and Mohammad Taghavi Sangdehi, the same branch issued death sentences under the charge of baghi on the basis of alleged affiliation with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran. In these cases, the Revolutionary Court acts less as a safeguard or corrective body and more as the place where judicial elimination is given final form.
This pattern is not limited to Tehran. Even within Tehran itself, in the case of Voria Ghaderi, the trial before Branch 28 of the Revolutionary Court was conducted briefly and behind closed doors, and the court-appointed lawyer was given only a few minutes to see the file before the hearing. In the cases of Ramin Hossein Panahi in Sanandaj and Shahin Vasaf in Urmia, pressure during interrogation, solitary confinement, denial of counsel, and extremely short hearings shaped the outcome before the ruling was issued. In all of these cases, the Revolutionary Court does not create distance between security detention and judicial judgment. It gives that same process formal legal legitimacy.
Torture, Solitary Confinement, and Forced Confessions
In many political and security cases, the detention and interrogation phase is not aimed at discovering the truth, but at breaking the detainee’s resistance and producing a confession. Solitary confinement, denial of contact with family, denial of counsel, beatings, and psychological pressure are all part of this process. In describing conditions in Ward 2-A, Atena Farghadani stated that “even inside the toilets, cameras had been installed.” Ali Kantouri also testified: “On the very first day I entered Ward 209, I was beaten for half an hour, and then I remained in complete solitary confinement for 25 days so that I would be prepared to accept the charges.” These descriptions show that solitary confinement in such cases is not simply a method of detention. It is part of the process of preparing the detainee to accept the accusation.
The available documentation presents torture-based confessions as the principal, and sometimes the only, evidence in security cases. One report on methods of extracting confessions states that beatings, flogging, electric shocks, suspension, mock executions, induced suffocation with water, and threats against family members are among the documented methods used in Iran. This list shows that the confession in such cases is often not the product of a lawful process, but of systematic coercion.
The case of Navid Afkari, which led to his execution in Shahrivar 1399, is one of the clearest examples of this pattern. In a written complaint to judicial authorities, he stated: “They subjected me to the most severe torture to force false confessions from me.” Shahin Naseri, who witnessed the torture, also wrote in a formal testimony: “I witnessed Navid Afkari being beaten with a pipe and a baton by two plainclothes officers in Shiraz.” Despite these records, the judiciary relied on those contested confessions and carried out the execution. In the case of Soheil Arabi, one of the main bases for the ruling was a confession obtained under severe psychological pressure and threats to arrest his wife. Vahid and Habib Afkari also repeatedly documented details of the torture they endured, but their complaints were dismissed by the prosecutor’s office.
The importance of this issue lies not only in the occurrence of torture, but in the judicial use of confessions obtained through torture. One human rights report states that Revolutionary Courts consistently rely on forced confessions, even when the defendant openly declares in court that the confession was extracted under torture. This is the precise point at which torture in detention becomes judicial evidence in court. In other words, in security cases, a forced confession is not a secondary violation. It is part of the architecture of sentencing.
The Supreme Court; A Formal Appeal and a Rapid Passage Toward Execution
On paper, death sentences are supposed to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. In the documented cases examined here, however, this stage often functions not as a deep and independent review, but as a rapid passage toward implementation. The short interval between the trial court’s judgment, Supreme Court confirmation, and execution reinforces the conclusion that appeal in these cases is largely emptied of real substance.
In the case of the three young men executed in Qom; Saleh Mohammadi, Mehdi Ghasemi, and Saeed Davoudi, their sentences were carried out at dawn on 28 Esfand 1404, corresponding to 19 March 2026, after confirmation by the Supreme Court. Saleh Mohammadi was 19 years old and was tried before the Criminal Court of Qom. He alleged that his confession had been extracted under torture, and it was reported that his hand had been broken as a result of beatings, yet the court rejected the claim without an effective investigation. The full ruling and indictment were never publicly released.
The same pattern appears in the case of the seven young protesters from the Namjoo Basij base. They were arrested on 18 Dey 1404, sentenced to death on 20 Bahman 1404, and among them Amirhossein Hatami was executed on 13 Farvardin 1405, corresponding to 2 April 2026, while Mohammadamin Biglari and Shahin Vahedparast were executed on 16 Farvardin 1405, corresponding to 5 April 2026, in Qezel Hesar Prison. Based on available case information, Ali Fahim is also among those executed. This short period between arrest, sentencing, and execution clearly shows that the appeal process neither created adequate time for defense nor served as an effective barrier.
Earlier cases confirm the same pattern. Mohsen Shekari was arrested on 3 Mehr 1401, sentenced on 29 Aban 1401, and executed on 17 Azar 1401. The available documentation states that both his sentence and its confirmation by the Supreme Court were handled at shocking speed and that he was denied access to counsel of his own choosing. Majidreza Rahnavard was also executed only 13 days after the beginning of his trial, to the extent that it remained unclear how any meaningful appellate review could have taken place in such a short time. In another period, it was reported that the Supreme Court confirmed at least eight death sentences within a short span. This volume of confirmations, together with the lack of transparency regarding the actual text of the rulings, presents a clear picture of the weak and largely formal nature of appeal in political and security cases.
Expedited and Secret Implementations of Death Sentences
The execution stage is the final link in this chain; the point at which judicial haste results in the physical elimination of the condemned person. The executive regulations governing death sentences require notice to counsel, verification that no legal obstacle exists, and recognition of rights such as the writing of a will and a final visit. Yet in political and security cases, this stage too has been marked by concealment, surprise, and the denial of the most basic rights.
In the case of the seven young protesters from the Namjoo Basij base, the execution process began with transfer to solitary confinement and was followed by sudden implementation. Amirhossein Hatami was executed in Qezel Hesar Prison on 13 Farvardin 1405. Then Mohammadamin Biglari, aged 19, and Shahin Vahedparast were executed in the same prison on 16 Farvardin 1405, secretly and without a final meeting with their families. In the same case, Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani, Shahab Zahdi, and Yaser Rajaeifar were also transferred to solitary confinement and placed at immediate risk of execution. This mode of implementation shows that concealment and surprise remain part of the mechanism of repression at its final stage.
In the case of the three young men executed in Qom, the implementation on 28 Esfand 1404 was also carried out rapidly and in an atmosphere of intimidation. The available materials indicate that these executions were carried out in the presence of members of the public. Such implementation serves not only to eliminate the condemned individual, but also to function as a public spectacle and warning; the death penalty is used not only against the person condemned, but as a message to society aimed at producing fear.
This pattern is not limited to recent cases. Navid Afkari was executed without prior notice to his family or lawyer and without a final visit. In the case of Babak Alipour and his co-defendants, it was similarly reported that the executions were carried out without prior notice to the prisoners themselves, their families, or their lawyers, and that after their transfer, no information was given about their fate or whereabouts. In this way, the implementation phase itself is transformed from a judicial process open to oversight into a form of concealed and unrestrained elimination.
Case Studies; When the Structure Becomes Visible in the Fate of the Victims
To understand this mechanism more concretely, two case studies are particularly important because they reveal the entire chain from arrest to execution.
The case of Mohsen Shekari was one of the first clear examples of this pattern during the 1401 protests. He was arrested on 3 Mehr 1401, sentenced on 29 Aban 1401, and executed on 17 Azar 1401. Documentation related to his case emphasizes that the proceedings were extremely rushed, that he was denied counsel of his own choosing, and that both his sentence and its confirmation by the Supreme Court proceeded at extraordinary speed. The importance of Shekari’s case lies in showing how a protest-related case can lead to execution in an exceptionally short period.
Alongside it, the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou is another important example because it combines denial of counsel, expedited proceedings, and disregard for the vulnerability of the defendant. He was arrested on 31 Shahrivar 1401. In the case linked to the charge of moharebeh, his chosen lawyers were not accepted by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court, he was denied counsel during the first month of detention, and his lawyers were summoned for final defense only one day after accepting representation. This case shows that in some instances, the haste toward sentencing dominates the entire process before a real defense can even begin.
The case of the seven young protesters from Basij Base 185 Shahid Mahmoud Kaveh is also of particular importance because of the volume of documentation available. In that case, Amirhossein Hatami, Mohammadamin Biglari, Shahin Vahedparast, Ali Fahim, Abolfazl Salehi Siavashani, Shahab Zahdi, and Yaser Rajaeifar were arrested on 18 Dey 1404 and sentenced to death on 20 Bahman 1404 by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court under Salavati. Several of them were executed in Qezel Hesar Prison in Farvardin 1405. This case is a compressed and very clear example of the functioning of the entire structure; arrest in the context of protest, denial of counsel, expedited proceedings, reliance on forced confessions, restricted access to the file, a death sentence, transfer to solitary confinement, and sudden execution.
Conflict with International Obligations; Unfair Trial, Torture, and Violation of the Right to Life
The practices seen in these cases are not only incompatible with the standards of a sound domestic trial process. They are also in clear conflict with Iran’s international obligations. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits arbitrary detention, and Article 14 guarantees access to a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defense, and communication with counsel of one’s own choosing. The existing documentation repeatedly places these principles against the actual practices of Revolutionary Courts and security cases in Iran.
UN general comments have also made clear that in cases involving the death penalty, the defendant must have effective legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings, and that punishment following a manifestly unfair trial is arbitrary. It has also been emphasized that any statement obtained under torture must be excluded from the proceedings. Yet in the cases documented in this report, allegations of torture were either ignored or rejected without effective investigation, and the same contested confessions were turned into the basis of the judgment. Under such conditions, execution cannot be understood as merely the implementation of a domestic ruling. From the standpoint of international law, it approaches arbitrary execution.
Official UN reports reinforce the same conclusion. One report refers to sham and summary trials. Another emphasizes that Revolutionary Courts consistently rely on forced confessions. Yet another warns that accelerated proceedings in security cases increase the risk of arbitrary and summary executions. Taken together, these standards and assessments show that the problem is not simply the violation of a few procedural rules. It is a structural conflict with the right to a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, and the right to life.
Conclusion
Report No. 5 shows that what was described in the previous report as denial of defense rights and judicial criminalization reaches, at this stage, the point of judgment and execution. In this structure, the Revolutionary Court is the place where the security narrative becomes a judicial ruling. Torture, solitary confinement, and forced confessions, instead of being investigated and excluded from the file, become in many cases effective evidence for the issuance of a death sentence. The Supreme Court, in a large number of these cases, has failed to play the role of a real barrier against defective judgments. The execution phase, through transfer to solitary confinement, withholding of information from family and counsel, denial of a final visit, and at times public or covert execution, completes the final link in this chain.
The cases of Mohsen Shekari, Mohammad Ghobadlou, the three executions in Qom, and the seven young protesters in the Namjoo Basij case are not merely separate examples. They show how the judicial structure of the ruling regime in Iran moves from the level of law and indictment to the level of judgment and physical elimination. Here, execution is not the end result of a fair trial. It is the final product of a pre-engineered process in which security detention, confession extraction, criminalization, Revolutionary Court proceedings, and expedited execution all operate together. Report No. 6 will follow this same path in its historical dimension; namely, by showing that this pattern is not a new phenomenon, but the continuation of an entrenched tradition of judicial repression from the 1980s to the political and security cases of today.
