In the first part of this report, the cases of dozens of lawyers who were arrested, summoned, prosecuted, or deprived of their professional rights were examined. These cases demonstrated that pressure on Iran’s legal community has evolved beyond isolated incidents and has become a nationwide pattern.
Yet a fundamental question remains: What connects these seemingly disparate cases? Are they merely a collection of separate security-related actions, or do they form part of a broader mechanism designed to control the right to defense in political and security-related cases?
This second part examines the role of Article 48 of Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure, restrictions on the right to choose legal counsel, and what many legal experts have described as the “engineering of the right to defense.”
Chapter Three: Engineering the Right to Defense in Iran
A review of cases involving Iranian lawyers in recent years demonstrates that their arrests, summonses, and professional sanctions cannot be understood simply as a series of unrelated incidents. What has emerged across cities including Mashhad, Rasht, Shiraz, Tehran, Tabriz, and Ahvaz points to the development of a broader mechanism aimed at controlling legal defense in political and security-related cases.
Mai Sato, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, has repeatedly warned in her reports and communications about increasing pressure on independent lawyers and the denial of detainees’ access to counsel of their own choosing. She has emphasized that lawyers who sought to defend protesters or document violations of their rights have faced summonses, arrests, threats, and judicial prosecution.
These concerns extend beyond the situation of a handful of lawyers. What has taken shape in Iran is a multi-layered mechanism for controlling the right to defense; one in which the arrest of lawyers, professional restrictions, Article 48, interference in the independence of the Bar Association, and limitations on access to case files all function as components of a single policy.
In an independent judicial system, lawyers play a vital role in maintaining a balance between state power and the rights of the accused. In many political and security-related cases in Iran, however, independent lawyers are viewed as obstacles to the security apparatus because they can document allegations of torture, challenge coerced confessions, record procedural violations during interrogations, and subject judicial proceedings to public scrutiny.
For this reason, pressure on lawyers cannot be analyzed separately from pressure on defendants. As the political climate becomes increasingly securitized and the number of detainees grows, efforts to control the defense process intensify as well. The objective is not merely to punish a number of lawyers; it is to limit society’s capacity to access independent legal representation.
This trend is reflected most clearly in Article 48 of Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure; a provision that has become one of the principal tools for restricting political and security-related defendants’ access to independent lawyers in recent years.
3.1. Article 48: Legalizing Restrictions on the Right to Defense
In many political and security-related cases, the denial of independent legal representation begins not in detention centers or courtrooms but within the legal structure of the case itself. The primary instrument enabling this process is Article 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Under this provision, individuals accused of offenses related to national security or certain other specified crimes may, during the preliminary investigation stage, choose legal counsel only from a list approved by the Head of the Judiciary. In practice, this restriction constitutes one of the most significant exceptions to the right to freely choose legal representation within Iran’s legal system.
Over the past several years, Article 48 has become one of the most controversial legal provisions in Iran. Critics argue that it has effectively created two separate systems of defense: one for ordinary criminal cases and another for political and security-related cases. As a result, defendants are deprived of the right to freely choose their lawyer precisely in those cases where independent legal representation is most essential.
The significance of this issue became even more pronounced following the nationwide protests of 2025. As the number of detainees increased and large numbers of security-related cases were opened, access to legal counsel emerged as one of the central areas of concern. During this period, numerous reports documented the denial of access to lawyers of choice, delays in lawyer-client meetings, and restrictions on lawyers’ access to case files.
The United Nations Fact-Finding Mission also noted in its reports that defendants in security-related cases have access only to lawyers approved by the judiciary during the investigative phase, and that this situation continues to affect judicial proceedings. United Nations Special Rapporteurs have likewise expressed concern regarding the compatibility of Article 48 with international fair trial standards.
The issue, however, extends beyond restrictions on choosing legal counsel. Many independent lawyers and international legal organizations argue that this mechanism has gradually replaced independent defense with controlled defense. In other words, while independent lawyers face arrest, suspension of their licenses, professional exclusion, or security-related pressure, the role of judiciary-approved lawyers in sensitive cases continues to expand.
This parallel development is not coincidental. The arrest of independent lawyers on the one hand and restrictions on the right to choose counsel on the other represent two dimensions of the same policy. The ultimate objective is to reduce the presence of independent legal observers during the most critical stages of political and security-related proceedings.
Under such circumstances, defendants face not only security agencies, investigators, and prosecutors but also restrictions on choosing their own legal representatives from the very beginning of the judicial process. For this reason, many international legal bodies view Article 48 not merely as a legal provision but as part of a broader mechanism for restricting the right to defense in Iran.
3.2. From Independent Lawyers to Article 48 Lawyers: Replacing Independent Defense with Controlled Defense
The arrest of independent lawyers, restrictions on the right to choose counsel, and the implementation of Article 48 may appear to be separate issues. In practice, however, they form components of a single mechanism that increases state control over legal defense in political and security-related cases.
In recent years, dozens of lawyers have faced arrest, imprisonment, suspension of their licenses, professional bans, or other restrictions because they represented political prisoners, protesters, journalists, women’s rights activists, labor activists, ethnic and religious minorities, and justice-seeking families. At the same time, defendants in security-related cases have encountered growing restrictions on their ability to choose legal counsel.
As the number of independent lawyers active in political cases declines, defendants become increasingly dependent on the limited pool of lawyers approved by the judiciary. In this way, the repression of independent lawyers and restrictions on the choice of counsel reinforce one another.
One of the principal instruments of this process is the system commonly known as “Article 48 lawyers.” Under this framework, defendants in security-related cases may select legal counsel during the investigative stage only from a list approved by the judiciary. Consequently, the right to freely choose a lawyer, a fundamental component of a fair trial, is restricted in the most sensitive categories of cases.
Critics have warned for years that this mechanism was designed not to safeguard the right to defense but to control it. When defendants lose the ability to choose an independent and trusted lawyer, the balance between the citizen and the security apparatus is fundamentally altered.
These criticisms have not come solely from human rights advocates. Some lawyers themselves have publicly criticized the conduct of Article 48 lawyers. In one instance, a lawyer wrote in reference to the conduct of an Article 48 lawyer: “You accepted the disgrace of being an Article 48 lawyer; at the very least, be honorable enough not to lie.”
Critics further argue that some Article 48 lawyers, because of structural ties to judicial and security institutions, lack the professional independence necessary to effectively represent political defendants. According to these critics, in certain cases the role of such lawyers has resembled the legitimization of judicial proceedings more than the effective defense of defendants’ rights.
Concerns regarding this mechanism intensified following the nationwide protests of 2025. Multiple reports indicate that, in some cases, even Article 48 lawyers were denied full access to case files and supporting documentation. In Mashhad, some of these lawyers encountered restrictions on accepting representation and accessing case materials. Similar reports emerged from Tehran concerning limitations on access to evidence.
These developments demonstrate that the issue extends beyond restrictions on the choice of counsel. In certain political and security-related cases, limitations have expanded from the selection of lawyers to the defense process itself.
Accordingly, the arrest of independent lawyers, Article 48, and restrictions on access to case files should not be viewed as separate issues. Together, they form a mechanism whose ultimate effect is the restriction of independent legal defense in political and security-related cases.
It is at this point that the concept of the “engineering of the right to defense” acquires practical meaning. Under this model, defense is not eliminated; it is controlled. The appearance of judicial process is maintained, while the capacity for independent legal representation is gradually constrained and managed. As a result, defendants may formally have access to legal counsel while being deprived, in practice, of genuinely independent and effective representation.
The mechanism for restricting the right to defense, however, does not end with Article 48 or limitations on the choice of counsel. In recent years, increasing pressure on the Bar Association and heightened restrictions in cases related to the nationwide protests of 2025 have demonstrated that this process has expanded further. The third part of this report examines the role of the Bar Association, protest-related prosecutions, and the responses of international legal and human rights organizations.
